AUSTIN, Texas (AP) _ The Texas Supreme Court has upheld the Austin divorce of a same-sex couple. The court ruled Friday that the state lacks standing to intervene in the divorce of Angelique Taylor and Sabina Daly, who were married in Massachusetts in 2004. The decision has no impact on Texas’ gay marriage ban. Governor Greg Abbott had challenged the divorce while he was still attorney general.
Click HERE to be directed to the links for downloading the opinion.
Background information courtesy of the Texas Supreme Court:
11-0114 State of Texas v. Angelique Naylor and Sabrina Daly and 11-0222
In re State of Texas from Travis County and the Austin Court of Appeals
For petitioner/relator: State of Texas: James D. Blacklock, Austin
For respondents/real parties in interest: James J. Scheske, Austin
Justice Lehrmann did not participate
AFFIRMED, MANDAMUS RELIEF DENIED, Justice Brown opinion:
The issues are (1) whether the attorney general has standing to intervene to contest a same-sex divorce after the trial court rendered final judgment granting the divorce for two women married in Massachusetts and (2) whether the state’s mandamus petition in this Court was proper without first filing in the court of appeals. After the trial court denied the state’s intervention, the attorney general appealed, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction under Texas law to hear a same-sex divorce case and that the court abused its discretion by denying intervention a day after the trial court’s final judgment. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the attorney general’s intervention and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court HOLDS that the appeals court properly determined that the state did not have standing to appeal in this case because its attempt to intervene was too late, after the final judgment, and that the initial mandamus petition was improper in the Supreme Court. The state raises three arguments supporting a right to appeal the disputed divorce decree: (1) its intervention motion was timely; (2) its standing is proper under the virtual-representation doctrine; and (3) it has standing on appeals by equitable considerations.
Timely intervention. Texas civil procedural Rule 60, governing intervention, does not impose a deadline for intervening, but the common law dictates that no one may intervene after a final judgment unless the trial court sets aside its judgment. Because the trial court disposed of all issues between the two parties in an oral decision, and because the trial court indicated its intent to render immediate judgment, the announcement served as a binding judgment effective when announced. The state’s petition was therefore too late when filed the next day and when the trial court chose not to set aside the judgment to entertain the state’s arguments. As a simple matter of fact and record, the state is not party to the case.
Virtual representation. To benefit from the virtual-representation doctrine, the prospective party on appeal must establish that (1) it is bound by the judgment; (2) its privity of estate, title or interest appears from the record; and (3) an identity of interest exists between the would-be party on appeal and a party to the judgment. Even the state concedes it cannot satisfy the elements of the doctrine. The state contends, arguing that it has an identity with Sabrina Daly, that Daly represented its interests at the trial court, as she originally contested Naylor’s divorce petition and contended the marriage should just be declared void. Yet Daly’s interests – she at all times asserted the legitimacy of her same-sex marriage – were never aligned with the state’s. Although Daly ostensibly contested the divorce and even submitted briefs outlining the state’s proposed alternate procedure for same-sex couples, Daly’s counsel expressly distanced himself and his client from the state’s position.
Equity. The state urges the Court to find an equitable basis for appellate standing in light of the unusual importance of the issues presented. As a sovereign entity, the state has an intrinsic right to enact, interpret and enforce its own laws, particularly with respect to family law and a constitutional amendment overwhelmingly passed by popular vote. Before the Court or the court of appeals can evaluate the equity of intervention, the prospective intervenor must establish its standing to present its argument on appeal. But the existence of standing – or the lack thereof – is a rigid question of law that is not negotiable and cannot be waived.
Mandamus relief. If a mandamus petition is filed initially in the Supreme Court, the petition must state a compelling reason why it was not first presented to the appeals court. The state argues it did not file a mandamus petition in the appeals court because it thought it would have standing to appeal. But a litigant’s mistaken understanding of law is not a compelling reason for the Court to consider an unreviewed mandamus argument. Just weeks earlier and with respect to the same constitutional question the state presses in this case, it sought both appellate and mandamus relief from the court of appeals in the companion case heard with this one. (See note below about its dismissal.)
Justice Boyd CONCURRING:
A point on which everyone agrees bears emphasizing: the state is not bound by the divorce decree at issue in this case. The virtual representation doctrine does not apply here precisely because the judgment is not binding on the state. As a non-party not bound by the judgment, the state has no obligation to give any effect to the trial court’s divorce decree. In fact, it may be, as the state contends, that the state’s laws prohibit the state and all of its agencies and political subdivisions from giving any effect to the decree. However controversial and fluid these social issues may currently be, the Texas Constitution still provides that marriage in this state shall consist “only of the union of one man and one woman.”
Justice Willett DISSENTING, joined by Justices Guzman and Devine:
This decision turns on state procedural law, not federal constitutional law, but procedural matters matter. Intervention is an equitable doctrine, and the equities should be balanced differently. Some may frame this case as a purely private dispute, which is precisely the issue: whether weighty public concerns – the application and constitutionality of Texas marriage law – are sufficiently intertwined to warrant hearing from the state. The state’s chief legal officer – sworn to “preserve, protect, and defend” Texas law – should be permitted to preserve, protect and defend it.
Justice Devine DISSENTING:
Resolving this case, which concerns a trial court’s grant of a divorce to a same-sex couple, requires reaching additional issues than whether the attorney general should be allowed to challenge the trial court’s decision. Texas law recognizes only traditional, heterosexual marriages and it divests state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over same-sex divorce proceedings. The traditional marriage concept, which the state intervened to protect, does not violate the U.S. Constitution. Though this issue is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, it must be reached to dispose of this case.
Note: A companion cause, 11-0024, In re J.B. and H.B., a same-sex divorce case from Dallas County, is dismissed on orders as moot because of a party’s death.